This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to study how subjects' decision making may be affected by the timing of participation payments (or show-up fees). The experiment follows Davis et al. (J. Econ. 30:69-95, 2004) where subjects were asked to make a sequential purchase decision and were given the opportunity to purchase information about the value of a good prior to a decision to purchase the good itself. There, subjects purchased information less often than expected which was interpreted as risk-seeking behavior. Here, we test a payment hypothesis by varying the timing of the participation payment. Payment of a show-up fee before the decision-making stages of the experiment increases information purchase, which we interpret as an increase in risk-averse behavior.
Paying experimental subjects a portion of their earnings as a fixed amount to induce volunteering is a common practice among experimental economists. Friedman and Sunder, in their book Experimental Methods: A Primer for Economists (1994) , state: "Subjects prefer to be paid in cash" (p. 81), but never mention timing of payments. This oversight is probably accidental, but does leave the impression that payment timing is incidental to more important procedures in doing experiments. Furthermore, the possibility that the timing of payments to experimental subjects in general, and the timing of any fixed amounts in particular, could affect behavior has received little attention in the literature. This paper analyzes whether differential timing of these 'participation' payments or 'show-up' fees influences behavior in a sequential decision experiment where subjects could accept a varying level of risk by purchasing (or not) information about the value of a good prior to purchasing it.
In most experiments, the participation payment or show-up fee amounts to 5-30% of a subject's total compensation, with the remaining earnings determined, at least in part, by subjects' actions in the experiment and some random effects. Most researchers use these payments as an aid to recruiting subjects and/or to demonstrate credibility with regards to making cash payments, the latter being particularly important at institutions where research experiments in economics are not widely used or understood by subjects. 1 Despite the widespread use of these types of payments, there is no consistent methodology for how or when to make them. Some researchers make the payment up front, in some cases even before subjects enter the room where the experiment will take place, with cash given to subjects for just 'showing up.' In other cases, the participation payment is simply announced in the instructions or during the recruitment process and is then added to the subjects' experimental earnings as one lump sum at the conclusion of the experiment.
To better understand the habits of experimentalists in this area, we sent an email questionnaire to ask authors of papers in recent issues of this journal about their work. We contacted all authors whose papers appeared in Experimental Economics in 2006 or 2007. Of the 44 papers published, we received replies from 20 authors, 18 of which were appropriate for our questions. Of those 18 papers, 14 authors indicated paying a show up fee (usually $5US), with 12 paying the show-up fee as part of the final payment and two paying up front. In addition, most authors indicated that it was habit or ease of administration that drove their decision about when to pay the show-up fee. This information is, of course, anecdotal but it serves to highlight three key points. First, show-up fees are widely used; second, there is variability in how they are paid; and third, by and large, the specific decisions about how and when to make this type of payment may not be as carefully controlled as other aspects of experimental design. This paper investigates whether the way in which subjects are paid for participation affects their willingness to make risky decisions. In particular, if subjects are paid
